Municipal Affairs—Impact of Regional Facilities on Local Variance Decisions: National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist by unknown
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 16
January 1979
Municipal Affairs—Impact of Regional Facilities
on Local Variance Decisions: National Merritt, Inc.
v. Weist
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Municipal Affairs—Impact of Regional Facilities on Local Variance Decisions: National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist, 16 Urb. L. Ann. 405 (1979)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol16/iss1/13
IMPACT OF REGIONAL FACILITIES ON
LOCAL VARIANCE DECISIONS:
National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist
Local governments consider various factors when making zoning
decisions,' seeking a balance between the general welfare of the com-
munity and a landowner's right to use his property as he chooses.2
Some of these same factors are reviewed when a landowner seeks
relief from burdensome zoning ordinances by obtaining a variance.3
In determining the reasonableness of local zoning ordinances, courts
will often consider conditions outside the physical boundaries of the
municipality.4 A tension arises, however, because municipalities
would often prefer to exclude unpleasant or burdensome land uses if
1. Zoning regulations are designed to encourage land uses that promote the public
health, safety, morals and general welfare of the local community. Factors consid-
ered include traffic patterns, schools, and "other public requirements." I R. ANDER-
SON. AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, §§ 2.22, 2.24 (2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as R.
ANDERSON]. See also Fox Meadow Estates, Inc. v. Culley, 233 App. Div. 250, 252,
252 N.Y.S. 178, 180, a ff'dmem., 261 N.Y. 506, 185 N.E. 714 (1931) (a locality "may
adopt plans suitable to its own peculiar location and needs, acting reasonably"); Note,
Regional Development and the Courts, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 600, 608 (1965).
2. Zoning regulations attempt to balance public needs against private burdens.
See, e.g., 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 5.10. However, "[n]o zoning plan can
possibly provide for the general good and at the same time so accommodate the pri-
vate interest that everyone is satisfied." Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y.
115, 118, 89 N.E.2d 619, 620 (1949). See note 8 infra.
3. To be individually exempted from applicable zoning ordinances the landowner
must obtain a variance. This allows him to have a non-conforming use on his land
without attacking the actual validity of the zoning ordinance. See notes 18-20 and
accompanying text infra.
4. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 341 N.E.2d
236, 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681 (1975) ("in enacting a zoning ordinance, considera-
tion must be given to regional needs and requirements"); Levitt v. Incorporated Vil-
lage of Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 272, 160 N.E.2d 501, 502, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214
(1959) (isolated rural character of community considered).
Courts usually consider three extra-territorial factors in determining the validity of
a zoning ordiance: external zoning or development, external facilities, and regional
needs. Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municoal Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107,
107-08. See also note 34 and accompanying text infra.
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they can satisfy their citizens' needs by utilizing facilities of neighbor-
ing communities.5 The problem is that, in the modern world of eco-
nomics, "[tihere is no such thing as a free lunch": a gain acquired by
one entity can only be obtained at the cost of another.6 Recently, in
National Merrill, Inc. v. Weist,7 a New York court denied a variance
for a more intensive use partly because of the availability of similar
facilities nearby. Courts usually consider the municipality's zoning
impact on surrounding regions;8 the National Merritt decision repre-
sents a trend to consider regional impact on local needs.
In National Merritt, plaintiff sought a variance to build a large
shopping center on land limited by area restrictions9 to light retail
development' ° benefiting the local residents of Briarcliff Manor."
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the zoning board's denial
of plaintiffs variance,' 2 noting the board's reliance upon the negative
regional impact'3 of the proposed shopping center.' 4 The court also
5. The parties affected by this type of zoning decision can be categorized as fol-
lows: the landowner, concerned with the uses to which his land may be put; the neigh-
borhood, concerned with maintaining its character; the municipality, concerned with
maintaining a balance of different neighborhoods to serve the community as a whole;
and the region, a much broader area, concerned with efficient allocation of land uses.
6. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 41, 42 (1972).
7. 41 N.Y.2d 438, 361 N.E.2d 1028, 393 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1977).
8. See Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 302-03, 150 N.E. 120, 124 (1925). See
also Hoffman V. Harris, 17 N.Y.2d 138, 146-47, 216 N.E.2d 326, 331. 269 N.Y.S.2d
119, 125 (1966); Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121
N.E.2d 517, 122 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1954).
9. The zoning ordinance as applied to plaintiffs property allowed a maximum
floor area of 15,000 square feet per individual retail establishment, and a maximum
length of 180 feet per individual structure. Plaintiffs proposed shopping center would
cover 180,500 square feet, comprised mainly of three large retail stores, and would be
965 feet in length. 41 N.Y.2d at 440, 361 N.E.2d at 1030, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 381-82.
10. Plaintiffs 19 3/4-acre parcel was zoned "General Business B-2," the most lib-
eral in the village ordinance. Permissible uses other than retail development included
professional or business office, bank, restaurant, motion picture theatre, gasoline sta-
tion, motor vehicle salesroom, and laundry. Id. at 440, 361 N.E.2d at 1030, 393
N.Y.S.2d at 381.
11. The village's policy was to limit retailing services "primarily for the conven-
ience of the inhabitants of the Village and the immediate locality." Id.
12. 41 N.Y.2d at 443, 361 N.E.2d at 1032, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
After plaintiffs petition for a variance was denied by the zoning board of appeals,
the Supreme Court of Westchester County reversed the board's decision and granted
the variance. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed and dismissed
the petition. National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist, 50 App. Div. 2d 817, 376 N.Y.S.2d 571
(1975).
13. "Negative regional impact" in this context refers to the availability of shop-
[Vol 16 405
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol16/iss1/13
IMPACT OF REGIONAL FACILITIES
cited the shopping center's potential adverse impact on the village's
residential character and the likelihood of increased traffic congestion
and flood control problems.' 5
States generally delegate land use regulation power to local gov-
ernments' 6 who in turn enact zoning ordinances. 7 A landowner may
be granted a variance from a burdensome zoning ordinance if he can
show that he will not realize a reasonable return from his property as
zoned, that the conditions which prevent reasonable use of his land
are unique to that land and are not generally present in the neighbor-
hood, and that the variance will not alter the essential character of
the zoned locality. 8 Through a variance, a municipality may relieve
ping center facilities in the surrounding region, making construction of local facilities
unnecessary.
14. 41 N.Y.2d at 445, 361 N.E.2d at 1033, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
15. 41 N.Y.2d at 444, 361 N.E.2d at 1033, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 384. See note 38 infra.
16. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 5.01.
Protection of the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the community
through land use regulation has been recognized as a valid exercise of the police
power. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
17. Courts grant a presumption of constitutionality to municipal zoning ordi-
nances. See City of Ann Arbor v. Northwest Park Constr. Corp., 280 F.2d 212, 223
(6th Cir. 1960); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950); American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. City of
Chicago, 35 Ill. App. 3d 22, 25, 341 N.E.2d 31, 33 (1975); Dauernheim, Inc. v. Town
of Hempstead, 33 N.Y.2d 468, 473, 310 N.E.2d 516, 519, 354 N.Y.S.2d 909, 914
(1974)y Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 296, 150 N.E. 120, 122 (1925); Benham v.
Board of Supervisors, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 245, 249, 349 A.2d 484, 487 (1975). See 1
R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, § 3.09 at 93.
18. Dauernheim, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 33 N.Y.2d 468, 473, 310 N.E.2d
516, 518, 354 N.Y.S.2d 909, 913 (1974) (variance denied absent proof of no reasonable
return on property restricted to residential use); Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay, 32
N.Y.2d 78, 81, 295 N.E.2d 788, 790, 343 N.Y.S.2d 118, 121-22 (1973) (variance denied
absent proof of lack of reasonable return); Comment, New York Zoning
Law-Variance Remedy Revived- The Impact of Fulling on N.YX Zoning Law, 29
RUTGERS L. REV. 172, 174-75 (1975).
When seeking relief from a zoning ordinance, the landowner has the initial burden
of proof to show unreasonable economic injury from the classification. Salamar
Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 226, 275 N.E.2d 585, 588, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933,
938 (1971); Fulling v. Palumbo, 21 N.Y.2d 30, 33, 233 N.E.2d 272, 274, 286 N.Y.S.2d
249, 252 (1967). It was not disputed in National Merritt that plaintiff would suffer
severe financial hardship in developing his property as a shopping center under the
existing zoning ordinances. 41 N.Y.2d at 440, 361 N.E.2d at 1030, 393 N.Y.S.2d at
382.
When a hardship is self-created or self-imposed, the hardship by itself is not
enough to entitle the landowner to a variance. See Overhill Bldg. Co. v. Delany, 28
1979)
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a landowner of undue hardships' 9 and authorize a different use of the
property, yet still preserve the integrity of the zoning scheme for
other property.2 °
Every zoning decision must weigh the needs of the various parties
N.Y.2d 449, 455-56, 271 N.E.2d 537, 540, 322 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700 (1971). The New
York Court of Appeals recently took a more liberal view toward self-imposed hard-
ships. Compare National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist, 41 N.Y.2d 438, 442, 361 N.E.2d 1028,
1032, 393 N.Y.S.2d 379, 383 (1977) ("the fact that the hardship is self-created does not
foreclose board approval of an area variance") and Conley v. Town of Brookhaven.
40 N.Y.2d 309, 314, 353 N.E.2d 594, 597, 386 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (1976) (area variance
granted when hardship was self-imposed) with 113 Hillside Ave. Corp. v. Zaino, 27
N.Y.2d 258, 261, 265 N.E.2d 733, 734, 317 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (1970) (denial of a
variance upheld where hardship self-created or self-imposed) and Hoffman v. Harris,
17 N.Y.2d 138, 143, 216 N.E.2d 326, 329, 269 N.Y.S.2d 119, 122 (1966) (denial of
variance where building converted into rental apartments long after adoption of zon-
ing ordinance prohibiting such rental). The National Merritt court ruled that plaintiff
knew of the zoning ordinance when he purchased the land, and consequently could
not claim relief from his self-imposed hardship. 41 N.Y.2d at 444-45, 361 N.E.2d at
1032-33, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
Once the landowner proves unreasonable economic injury, the burden of proof
shifts to the municipality to show that the regulation was promulgated to promote the
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community. National Merritt, Inc. v.
Weist, 41 N.Y.2d 438, 443, 361 N.E.2d 1028, 1032, 393 N.Y.S.2d 379, 383 (1977);
Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 226, 275 N.E.2d 585, 588, 325
N.Y.S.2d 933, 937-38 (1971); Overhill Bldg. Co. v. Delany, 28 N.Y.2d 449, 454, 271
N.E.2d 537, 539, 322 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699-700 (1971). If the municipality fails to meet
its burden of proof, the landowner may be granted the variance requested. See Ful-
ling v. Palumbo, 21 N.Y.2d 30, 33, 233 N.E.2d 272, 274, 286 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252 (1967)
(variance could not be denied after landowner showed significant financial hardship,
until village put on proof of public benefit to be derived from the regulation).
Following the municipality's proof that the ordinance is a proper exercise of the
police power, the landowner must show there is no reasonable use or return left to his
property if the zoning ordinance is enforced. See National Merritt, Inc. v. Weist, 41
N.Y.2d 438, 442, 361 N.E.2d 1028, 1032, 393 N.Y.S.2d 379, 383 (1977); Williams v.
Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78, 82, 295 N.E.2d 788, 791, 343 N.Y.S.2d 118, 122
(1973); Forrest v. Evershed, 7 N.Y.2d 256, 262, 164 N.E.2d 841, 844, 196 N.Y.S.2d
958, 962 (1959). See generally Sax, note 16 supra.
19. Undue hardship arises when a landowner cannot reasonably use his land, and
therefore may be a basis for granting a variance. See Jayne Estates, Inc. v. Raynor,
22 N.Y.2d 417, 239 N.E.2d 713, 293 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1968) ("unnecessary hardship" es-
tablished as basis for granting variance); Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d
851 (1939) (no variance granted where no showing of "unnecessary hardship"). See
generally 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at §§ 18. 16-.45.
20. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at § 18.02. This important characteristic of
variances is described as "relief value." D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 106 (1971). Cf Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatch-
er, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938) (plaintiff proved no reasonable use under
zoning ordinance, but since all property in area was similarly situated, court denied
variance and invalidated ordinance).
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affected 2 by balancing the individual landowner's needs against the
town's overall land use objectives22 and the impact on the local
21. There is a continuum along which each case must fall. At one end the zoning
ordinance is valid as to all property to which it applies, and at the other end the
ordinance creates an unconstitutional taking of private property without compensa-
tion. A variance is needed where the ordinance reasonably applies as to some, but not
all, of the property it regulates. If a landowner is at the end of the continuum where
his burden greatly exceeds the social value of the ordinance, he may sue for inverse
condemnation, bring a declaratory judgment action to declare the ordinance invalid,
or request a variance. The particular facts of each case will determine whether the
landowner is entitled to relief. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508,
542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (diminution
in market value from $400,000 to $75,000 not sufficient showing of hardship to obtain
relief); McGowan v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 434, 361 N.E.2d 1025, 393 N.Y.S.2d 376
(1977) (diminution in value not sufficient by itself to show improper exercise of police
power, given reasonable goal of maintaining neighborhood character); Grimpel As-
socs. v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 431, 361 N.E.2d 1022, 393 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1977) (rezoning
from business to residential use held invalid since no reasonable use for property
remained); Conley v. Town of Brookhaven, 40 N.Y.2d 309, 315, 353 N.E.2d 594, 598,
386 N.Y.S.2d 681, 684 (1976) (financial hardship is a factor to be considered, though
not determinative by itself); Stevens v. Town of Huntington, 20 N.Y.2d 352, 357, 229
N.E.2d 591, 594, 283 N.Y.S.2d 16, 19 (1967) (diminution in value does not automati-
cally render restrictive zoning unconstitutional, but a significant loss in value may be
an indication of lack of reasonable return); Crossroads Recreation, Inc. v. Broz, 4
N.Y.2d 39, 46, 149 N.E.2d 65, 68, 172 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133-34 (1958) ("[Tlhe only perti-
nent inquiry is whether the present allowed use is yielding a reasonable return. That
it may not be the most profitable use is immaterial."). But see DuPage County v.
Halkier, 1 111. 2d 491, 115 N.E.2d 635 (1953) (large reduction in property value suffi-
cient to invalidate zoning ordinance); Phipps v. City of Chicago, 339 Ill. 315, 171 N.E.
289 (1930) (rezoning to residential use held invalid because "best use" was for com-
mercial and industrial purposes).
22. Land use objectives are often expressed through a comprehensive plan, de-
fined as "a general plan to control and direct the use and development of property in
a municipality or a large part thereof by dividing it into districts according to the
present and potential use of the properties." Miller v. Town Planning Comm'n, 142
Conn. 265, 269, 113 A.2d 504, 505-06 (1955). A municipality may use a comprehen-
sive plan to develop a "balanced, cohesive community," and efficiently allocate avail-
able land. Berenson, v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 341 N.E.2d 236,
241, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 680 (1975).
The STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce rev.
ed. 1926), in effect in 47 states with various modifications, provides that zoning should
be accomplished "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." However, the STAN-
DARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT § 2 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1928) made lo-
cal planning optional. Construing the two Acts in conjunction with each other, the
State Act has been interpreted to mean that zoning need only be based on a compre-
hensive review of local conditions, rather than a comprehensive plan per se.
Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74
MICH. L. REv. 899, 901-02 (1976). The NationalMerritt court illustrates this compre-
hensive review by considering residential neighborhood characteristics, flood and
1979]
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neighborhood.23 Although courts frequently contemplate the impact
of local zoning regulation on areas outside the community,24 few
cases consider the question of whether facilities outside of the munic-
ipality should influence local land use decisions.
A New Jersey court addressed this problem in Duffcon Concrete
Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill,25 sustaining a municipality's
exclusion of heavy industry on the basis that such industrial uses may
be relegated to the neighboring region. 6 However, the court implied
that the town should also allow ample business uses to satisfy its resi-
dents' needs.27 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Valley View Village,
Inc. v. Proffett,28 upheld an ordinance restricting the entire village to
residential use. The court sustained preservation of the village's resi-
drainage problems, and traffic control. 41 N.Y.2d at 445, 361 N.E.2d at 1031, 393
N.Y.S.2d at 385.
In determining whether the statutory requirement for a comprehensive review of
local conditions has been met, courts will consider whether the community's land use
problems have been fully weighed. Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 470, 235 N.E.2d
897, 900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 894 (1968). See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
23. The main limitation on the municipality's zoning power is that it may not
restrict the use of the land so as to amount to an unconstitutional taking without
compensation. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922). Unfortu-
nately, "[t]here is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking be-
gins." Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). See notes 2,8. and
17 and accompanying text supra.
24. See note 4 and accompanying text suprar note 34 and accompanying text in-
fta.
25. 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
26. The court found it necessary to look beyond conditions prevailing within the
municipality, to the "nature of the entire region" and the most advantageous use for
the land in that region. The court noted that the "effective development of a region
should not and cannot be made to depend upon the adventitious location of munici-
pal boundaries." Id. at 513, 64 A.2d at 349-50.
27. The court was vague as to the exact standard to be applied to determine which
uses were required to be permitted:
Where there exists a small residential municipality the physical location and cir-
cumstances of which are such that it is best suited for continuing residential de-
velopment and, separated therefrom but in the same geographical region, there is
present a concentration of industry in an area peculiarly adapted to industrial
development and sufficiently large to accommodate such development for years
to come, the power of the municipality to restrict its territory to residential pur-
poses with ample provision for such small businesses, trades and light industries
as are needed to serve the residents, is clear.
Id. at 515, 64 A.2d at 351.
28. 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955).
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dential character as a valid zoning goal, "so long as the business and
industrial needs of [the village's] inhabitants are supplied by other
accessible areas in the community at large."29 Other jurisdictions
subsequently upheld citywide single-use zoning where residents'
needs could be satisfied by nearby extra-municipal facilities.3"
In a Missouri case, McDermott Y. Village of Calierton Park,3 an
entire village was zoned for single-family dwelling use. Plaintiff de-
sired to build a shopping center, but the court found that nearby
commercial facilities adequately met the village's needs. In uphold-
ing the single-family zoning ordinance, the court noted that multiple-
use zoning would benefit only the plaintiff and would thus ultimately
reach beyond the village's police power authority.32
Prior to National Merritt, the New York court considered the prob-
lem of regional impact on local needs in Berenson v. Town of New
Castle.33 The New York Court of Appeals refused to grant summary
judgment on the question of whether a town could validly exclude
multiple-family residences. The court emphasized that "considera-
tion must be given to regional needs and requirements, ' 34 although it
29. Id. at 418. The court noted that Valley View was "on the periphery of a large
metropolitan center," and was not a "self-contained community," but only a part of
"the economic and social whole." Id.
30. See. e.g., Cadoux v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 162 Conn. 425, 294 A.2d
582, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 924 (1972) (zoning ordinance which zoned entire town
residential upheld); Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 211, 81
N.W.2d 789, 795 (1957) ("a municipality on the periphery of a large metropolitan
center may constitutionally pass a one-use ordinance in order to retain its residential
character"); Village of Old Westbury v. Foster, 193 Misc. 47, 48, 83 N.Y.S.2d 148, 150
1948) (village authorities may keep the village free from business, as long as not
unreasonable or arbitrary). See also Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 11
N.J. Super. 405, 78 A.2d 435 (1951) (rezoning of most of borough to single-family
residential upheld).
31. 454 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1970).
32. Id. at 582.
Similarly, an entire Connecticut town was zoned residential. Plaintiffs request for
establishment of a town shopping center district was denied because adequate facili-
ties to fulfill the needs of the town's citizens already existed in a neighboring commu-
nity. Cadoux v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 162 Conn. 425, 294 A.2d 582, cert.
denied. 408 U.S. 924 (1972).
33. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
34. Id. at 110-11,341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681. The court's rationale in
Berenson indicates the general nature of the New York law concerning local zoning's
regional effect before National Merritt.
There must be a balancing of the local desire to maintain the status quo [sic]
within the community and the greater public interest that regional needs be met.
1979]
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noted that a totally undeveloped community might not be able to
entirely prohibit construction of multiple-family residences." The
Court of Appeals remanded the case to determine whether the town
had adequately considered regional needs in promulgating its single-
use ordinance.
36
Although Briarcliff Manor did not adopt single-use zoning, its zon-
ing ordinance similarly excluded certain land uses.37 The National
Merrilt court considered the existence of large shopping centers in
nearby communities 38 in reaching its conclusion that a variance was
not warranted, even though this effectuated exclusion of such facili-
Although we are aware of the traditional view that zoning acts only upon the
property lying within the zoning board's territorial limits, it must be recognized
that zoning often has a substantial impact beyond the boundaries of the munici-
pality. Thus, the court ... should also consider the effect of the ordinance on
the neighboring communities. . . . [A] town need not permit a use solely for the
sake of the people of the region if regional needs are presently provided for in an
adequate manner.
Id. See also Horizon Adirondack Corp. v. State, 88 Misc. 2d 619, 388 N.Y.S.2d 235
(1976) (the burden of the zoning regulation upon local owners must be balanced
against the broader interests of the region and the state).
35. 38 N.Y.2d at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681. The court cited
Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y.221, 177 N.E.427 (1931), in which zoning
restrictions were deemed "patently unreasonable" because "framed for the purpose of
excluding [apartment] buildings from the village in order to preserve it as a secluded
quiet community." Id. at 229-30, 177 N.E. at 430.
36. 38 N.Y.2d at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681. A recent Supreme
Court case held that a small village could restrict its entire area to use as one-family
dwellings. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The Berenson court
distinguished the town of New Castle from the village of Belle Terre on the grounds
that New Castle had a population of over 17,000 while Belle Terre had only 700. 38
N.Y.2d at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
37. 41 N.Y.2d at 440, 361 N.E.2d at 1030, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
38. 41 N.Y.2d at 445, 361 N.E.2d at 1033, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
The court noted that the proposed shopping center would have an adverse impact
on the residential character of the neighborhood. 41 N.Y.2d at 444, 361 N.E.2d at
1033, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 384. However, the land admittedly was to be put to some
commercial or industrial use. See note 10 supra.
Although the court considered the problem of traffic congestion, traffic problems
alone will not support a decision to deny a variance. See Stevens v. Town of Hunt-
ington, 20 N.Y.2d 352, 356, 229 N.E.2d 591, 594, 283 N.Y.S.2d 16, 19 (1967) quoting
Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y.493, 498, 121 N.E.2d 517. 519
(1954) (the solution to acute traffic problems "does not lie in placing an undue and
uncompensated burden" on the individual landowner "in the guise of regulation").
The case cited by the National Merritt court merely supports the view that traffic
congestion may be a proper consideration in a variance case. See Overhill Bldg. Co.
v. Delany, 28 N.Y.2d 449, 457, 271 N.E.2d 537, 541, 322 .N.Y.S.2d 696, 702 (1971).
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ties from the village. The court concluded that, since two large re-
gional shopping centers existed in neighboring communities, the
village could justifiably prevent random proliferation of shopping ar-
eas to efficiently allocate its available land resources "in light of both
local and regional needs."39
While Berenson laid down a moderate inclusionary rule,4" National
Merritt gives a municipality more power to exclude certain land uses
when regional demand for the facilities is absent. By recognizing the
validity of such regional review, National Merritt will thus allow a
municipality wider latitude in denying zoning variances for develop-
ments that could adversely affect the town's character.
Although there was an efficient allocation of land uses in National
Merritt, the implications of the decision are apparent: the acceptance
of some exclusionary zoning creates a danger that municipalities will
use this decision to maintain neighborhood virtues while depending
on other communities' commercial facilities.4 ' When municipalities
exclude "undesirable" commercial uses42 and force their neighbors to
carry the burden, an inequitable allocation of land uses may result.
The need for efficient use of our dwindling land resources compels
implementation of regional planning and regulation.43 Some states
have established extra-municipal agencies to regulate land uses.44
39. 41 N.Y.2d at 445, 361 N.E.2d at 1033, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
40. Berenson 's moderate inclusionary rule required that the town adequately pro-
vide for multiple-family residence. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
41. If municipalities take advantage of this power, inefficient and disorderly allo-
cation of land uses will result. "To some extent then, the regionalism doctrine...
might be branded localism-not an evaluation of the interests of the broader region
as a whole. It might even be regarded as an 'isolationist' view used in the guise of
'regionalism."' Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land- Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L.
REV. 513, 526 (1957). See text accompanying notes 42 & 43 infra. See also
Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use Regulation, 74
MICH. L. REV. 899, 915-20 (1976); Note, Regional Development and the Courts, 16
SYRACUSE L. REV. 600, 606-11 (1965).
42. These unwanted uses include large shopping centers and industrial uses. The
specific uses undesirable to any particular community will depend upon the existing
uses accepted by the community.
43. The federal government encourages regional planning by making it a prereq-
uisite to receiving certain federal funds. This often leads, however, to ad hoc creation
of regional planning agencies, underscoring the need for comprehensive legislation
establishing regional planning. Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan
in Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 899, 916 (1976).
44. Hawaii divided the state into four zones (urban, rural, agricultural, and con-
servation), and placed statewide power in its State Land Use Commission. HAW.
REV. STAT. § 205 (1976 & Supp. 1978). Counties may designate permitted uses within
19791
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
Until regional planning for land use regulation gains more wide-
spread acceptance, uncertainty will continue in zoning decisions. 45
Further effectuation of regional planning could help to relieve the
courts from being forced to produce quasi-legislative zoning deci-
sions. Only then will the competing interests of neighboring munici-
palities be resolved satisfactorily.46
Ruth M. Zimmerman
the zones, subject to the commission's general regulation. However, the counties,
rather than the commission, are responsible for enforcement.
Wisconsin adopted a Navigable Waters Protection Law to maintain the quality of
the state's waterways and shorelands. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.26 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
The Law is administered by the Department of Natural Resources. which may super-
vise counties' use of the shoreland. See Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201
N.W.2d 761 (1972).
Massachusetts' Zoning Appeals Act established a Housing Appeals Committee
within the Department of Community Affairs. It specifically provides for considera-
tion by local zoning boards of regional housing needs and traditional local planning
standards. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (1973 & Supp. 1978). See
Board of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 294 N.E.2d 393 (1973).
For a discussion of Florida's Environmental Land and Water Management Act of
1972, FLA. STAT. §§ 380.012-.10 (1974 & Supp. 1978), which creates state guidelines
and a state land planning agency, see Finnell, Saving Paradise: The Florida Environ-
mental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 103.
Other examples of state planning by legislation include California's Coastal Act of
1976 and the Vermont Environmental Act. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30010
(Deering Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3 §§ 2801-2878 (1972).
See also the ALl MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (adopted May 21, 1975),
which proposed the creation of a State Land Planning Agency with authority to exer-
cise powers granted by the Code. The Agency would not only consider the benefits
and detriments within the local jurisdiction, "but shall consider all relevant and mate-
rial evidence offered to show the impact of the development on surrounding ar-
eas. . . .[T]he Agency may consider, with other relevant factors, whether or not the
absence of such development denies adequate facilities to the surrounding areas." Id.
at § 7-402. See generally F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN
LAND USE CONTROL (1971), in which the authors appropriately stated that
[tihis country is in the midst of a revolution in the way we regulate the use of our
land. . . .The ancient regime being overthrown is the feudal system under
which the entire pattern of land development has been controlled by thousands
of individual local governments. . . .The tools of the revolution are new laws
taking a wide variety of forms but each sharing a common theme-the need to
provide some degree of state or regional participation in the major decisions that
affect the use of our increasingly limited supply of land.
Id. at 1.
45. The difficulty has been noted that while zoning problems are regional in
scope, zoning regulations are determined locally. See 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN
LAND PLANNING LAW §§ 160.01 & 163.22 (1975).
46. "State-wide or regional control of planning would insure that interests
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broader than that of the municipality underlie various land use policies." Golden v.
Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 376, 285 N.E.2d 291, 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 150 (1972).
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